Part 4: The Paper and my #CVofFailures

If you’ve made it this far, I’ll buy you some cookies!  Thank you for coming along on this ride.  This is the longest section.  It is the meat of the paper and where I prove my points by presenting the story and archival and other evidence.  One reviewer suggested that I find more primary sources within the government archives of both the US and the UK.  As I said in my first post, I don’t have the time or the funds to do that, which is unfortunate.  Here are the 2nd and 3rd posts, in case you missed them.  Without further adieu, and without pictures, here is the most possibly “overly dramatic” part:

James Henry Breasted, the Accidental Spy?

It is not likely that Breasted knew of Boas’ letter at the time, since it was written and published while Breasted was in Cairo; therefore, it is impossible to know if Boas’ points would have affected Breasted’s decision to gather information.  We only know that, possibly before but definitely very soon after his arrival in Egypt, he volunteered his services to the British Army to provide advice to His Majesty’s Government on how best to work with, control, and govern the native Arab peoples to whom they had promised so much in return for their support during the War (Gelvin, 25).   While British archaeologists did the groundwork and provided crucial information during the war, the British Army turned to a famous American archaeologist to be their eyes and ears in Mesopotamia in 1920.

Breasted had a very different experience in Mesopotamia than any of the other archaeologist-operatives, because of his career trajectory and stated goals.  He earned his PhD in Berlin in 1894 and had figured out early on in his career that his main goal was to trace and record the script and art on all the surviving monuments in Egypt before time took them (C. Breasted, 77; Abt, 82).   After his first trip to Egypt from 1894-95 and until 1914, Breasted worked diligently in Chicago, setting up new programs, teaching, and writing.  He traveled to Europe regularly for research, and sometimes to Egypt, spending hours in museums such as the British Museum, the Louvre, the Berlin Museum, and the Cairo Museum, copying the texts on the objects there.  By the time war broke out, Breasted was famous in intellectual circles for his scholarship and well-known among the general public for his main popular work, Ancient Times (Abt, 198-204).   The most important project to Breasted was getting financial support for his major goal at the University of Chicago: setting up an Institute for studying the history and archaeology of the Near East, and starting his survey and copying of all the surviving monuments in Egypt and the Levant (Abt, 207-228).   After the war was over, and after over a decade of applications, in May of 1919 John D. Rockefeller, Jr. agreed to fund Breasted’s epigraphic survey (C. Breasted, 240).   He was given a total of $50,000 for a period of 5 years, at a rate of $10,000 per year.  His son recollected (C. Breasted, 241) that upon receiving this money,

“My father at once set about organizing a reconnaissance expedition with a staff (which was to meet him in Cairo) comprising a colleague and four younger men, with himself as leader.  Its purpose was to determine what archaeological sites in the Near East could profitably be investigated or excavated; and to ‘secure by purchase at least a share of the ancient documents of all sorts which during the War had been accumulating in the hands of antiquity dealers both in Europe and the Near East.’   As soon as they learned of his imminent departure, a number of leading American museums desiring to expand their collections of Near Eastern art, sent him substantial letters of credit to cover such purchases in their behalf.”

Breasted’s main goals for this crucial expedition were to expand the collections at the Haskell Oriental Museum at Chicago and to figure out which archaeological sites were safe and available for work to be done.  He predicted that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would threaten the numerous sites in the Near East and wished to survey them as quickly as possible (Abt, 228-248).   Archaeologically, the expedition was a success.  The secondary goal was to help the British and Americans to peacefully solve some major political and cultural issues in the area by gathering information; in this he was partially successful.  He gathered and reported crucial information, but neither Britain nor the United States acted on his advice.

By the time that Breasted reached London, a usual stopover for Americans on their way to Egypt, he found it nigh impossible to secure transportation to anywhere in the Middle East.  He found the American Embassy less than helpful and in fact they impeded his travel.  This was understandable as the war in the Near East was hardly over, and in some places continued to break out periodically.  The US Government was hardly going to help send a scientist to the field, no matter who was paying the bill.  Thus, Breasted depended on the British Government to secure him transportation and letters of introduction that would guide him safely on his journey.  He received letters from Hogarth, who outside of his Intelligence work was Keeper of the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, introducing him on paper to General Edmund Allenby who was newly appointed High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, who in turn gave him more letters for passage (C. Breasted 242-244).   He also got letters from the Earl of Carnarvon, who had been funding excavations by Howard Carter in the Valley of the Kings since 1913, and was three years away from world-wide fame in the discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamun.

After many delays, Breasted finally arrived in Egypt in November of 1919 and was based in Cairo, where tourists had not yet been able to gain access due to the fact that Wilson’s “so-called peace had hardly penetrated the Near East” (C. Breasted, 242)   He had his letters of introduction to speed him through his entry into the country as well as the cooperation of the American diplomat in Egypt.  With official backing from the British Government and High Commissioner, he was set for his journey through the Mesopotamian desert (C. Breasted, 247).   Breasted was immediately invited to meet General Allenby and his wife in person at the British Residency in Cairo and they quickly formed a close friendship.  That autumn, Breasted took the Allenbys on tours of the Giza plateau, Saqqara, and the Cairo Museum, and from the start, Allenby openly shared with Breasted his diplomatic concerns for Britain in the Middle East.  According to Breasted, upon their first meeting and after Breasted had volunteered his services, Allenby told Breasted a story about a conversation with President Wilson before the Paris peace talks in which Wilson asked Allenby what would happen if the French were allowed to take over Syria.  Allenby reportedly replied that the French in Syria would “immediately result in a terrible war…and set the world on fire again” (30 November 1919).   Wilson later asked him, in front of the Peace Commissioners gathered for the talks, how to understand the wishes of the people over whom they would govern.  Allenby replied that the only way this could be done would be to ask the people, openly and directly (30 November 1919).   Wilson responded by sending to Mesopotamia what came to be known as the King-Crane Commission from June to August, 1919.  The purpose of the Commission was to closely interview as many native peoples as they could to see what they wanted for their future political situations.*   After the mission, which followed a similar path to the one Breasted and his crew would take six months later, the final report was ignored by the US government, then eventually suppressed.  The main result of this was that it gave hope to the native groups in Mesopotamia that America, not Britain or France, would come in to help them; in the end, they were disappointed.  Because the Commission had essentially failed, yet the British and French colonial ambitions were still strong, the respective governments wished to encourage native support; Breasted saw his expedition as one way for the Americans and the British to work together to do this.  Allenby thus gave orders to a Residency staff officer to make the travel arrangements for Breasted’s expedition through the Army Administration (14 December 1919).   The British were the central authority in the area at the time and their making arrangements seemed to be the most efficient means of getting the travel organized, and Breasted wrote: “I must say these Englishmen have treated me mighty well.  I have found universal cordiality and kindness and readiness to help” (14 December 1919).   While they could not guarantee a specific date of travel, the Army was in charge of his plans.

From November through February, when the expedition finally left Cairo, Breasted continued working in the Cairo museum making copies and transcribing the script on coffins and monuments.  He also visited Upper Egypt to continue buying antiquities in the markets.  He ended up spending, according to his own accounting, over $70,000 worth of antiquities for various museums and collections, including the Art Museum and the new Oriental Institute (30 December 1919).   In January, Allenby gave him permission to fly over Cairo and take photographs of the pyramids, the city, and the desert.  It was quite an adventure for him, being his first time in an open airplane.  He said that he had trouble breathing and the noise was so terrible that he wondered if he would complete the whole two-hour trip.  He did, but not before he “leaned over the cockpit rail and surrendered to the Sahara a very good thirty piaster lunch!” (15 January 1920)   When he was not getting sick, he reveled in the beauty of the views.  He wrote: “…the full splendor of it all broke upon me, and it was thrilling beyond all words to express” (15 January 1920).   He saw the Delta and the desert, 100 miles in every direction. As they came upon the Giza pyramid group, they hovered over the Great Pyramid.  Breasted wrote: “I suppose I am the first archaeologist who has ever opened a camera on the pyramid from a point where all four sides could be seen at once” (15 January 1920).   When they landed, he was happy to be back on the ground and as he and Ludlow Bull went back to Cairo, had 20 pictures of the pyramids to show for it.

By February, Allenby had gotten him passage on a P&O steamship from Port Said, sailing on 18 February, bound for Bombay, India.  There was near-constant fighting in the Transjordan and the usual route overland from Cairo to Baghdad was not passable.  For safety’s sake, then, the route Breasted and his crew took had to “follow the two long sides of a triangle with its apex at Bombay, a distance of over 5000 miles” (C. Breasted, 243).   Before the expedition left, Breasted went to the Residency to bid the Allenbys goodbye.  The General gave Breasted a French report on the state of Syria to read while he wrote an introduction letter to Prince Feisal, then of Syria, to ensure Breasted’s protection.  The report, marked “SECRET,” detailed the state of affairs in the area the French were attempting to occupy.  Breasted wrote to his family, as well as to President Judson of Chicago of the situation: “It is evident that the whole middle section of the Fertile Crescent from Baghdad to Aleppo and Damascus is on fire, and a concerted effort is being made by the Turks and the Arabs to throw the French into the sea.  We shall not get far from Baghdad, I fear.  Be quite free from all anxiety” (18 February 1920).**   Though their destinations were in a daily state of flux, in the end, the expedition went from Cairo by boat to Bombay, then again by boat to Basra and essentially followed the Euphrates River as it wound its way through the desert.  Going northwest, they saw a number of cities and villages, including Basra, Baghdad, Tikrit, Fallujah, Anah, Deir ez-Zor, and Aleppo; from there they turned back southwest and travelled to cities including Beirut, Damascus, Haifa, and Jerusalem.  All along the way, they did archaeological reconnaissance and purchased antiquities at the ancient sites of Ur, Babylon, Nimrud, Ninevah, and Damascus, as well as doing covert political intelligence gathering.

Breasted knew he would gather intelligence on the state of the area, because he volunteered for it, but the covert work actually began early on, and seemed to be a surprise.  On the ship to Bombay, Breasted and his crew met “a big, ponderous, florid-faced Briton named Major Pratt-Barlow.  …though [he is] very taciturn and modest, but we have at last induced him to talk” (27 February 2910).   Pratt-Barlow allowed Breasted to read T. E. Lawrence’s report to Allenby about his own experiences and thoughts on the situation in Syria.  Breasted recounted that “The French are so insanely jealous of Lawrence’s power and influence among the Arabs, that the British have not published Lawrence’s report for fear of offending the French.  It is a pity, for it is an extraordinary document” (27 February 1920).   That Pratt-Barlow would let Breasted read this document would be a little unexpected, unless Breasted had particular clearances from Allenby that we do not know about.  From Bombay, they sailed to Basra, which was then a “vast military camp extending four miles along the Shatt el-Arab, with shipping, native and English” (9 March 1920).   Here they planned to follow the new railway from Basra to Baghdad, which was quite safe, Breasted said, and which passed through the ancient site of Ur of the Chaldees where they would survey and then begin a camel caravan to Baghdad, zigzagging so to stay near the railway (10 March 1920).   Along the way, from site to site and city to city, they stayed in various military housing units; many times these were the only housing options available.  They met not only with Army officials, but also with leaders of local importance, many of whom seemed to know of their arrivals in advance.  They were given every hospitality possible by both groups, the native groups often having better food than the Army units.

As they worked, Breasted’s team witnessed some questionable actions on the part of the British Army.  One Major Daly, whom they met near the ancient site of Babylon, told Breasted about tearing down hundreds of ancient fortresses that had been, according to Daly, hampering relations among the local tribes for centuries.  If tearing down forts did not work to subdue the native groups, then Daly told Breasted that he would simply bomb the tribes into submission.  Breasted’s response to these methods, which on the one hand he thought should be “condemned on humanitarian grounds,” was, on the other hand, to “consider the alternative” (30 March 1920)    The alternative was what Breasted termed “Arab liberty,” which he described as “the opportunity to oppress all his neighbors and raise unlimited hell” (30 March 1920).   He continued, arguing that Wilson’s fourteen points would work well indeed in these situations, but that the British were refusing to use them.  Even still, he continually found local people who were willing to praise the English arrival and all the good it had done for them.  One local man near this site told Breasted that the Ottoman rulers had indeed been cruel, but that with the English “things are much better now” (2 April 1920).

Breasted and his crew met archaeologist and intelligence official Gertrude Bell in Baghdad when she was a dinner guest at the home of Major-General Percy Hambro, Quartermaster-General of the British Army in Mesopotamia (C. Breasted, 274; 10 April 1920).   Breasted described her as “an Englishwoman who has been out here among the Arabs, like Lady Hester Stanhope, for some 25 years—of course no longer young, and a terrible blue stocking, but I have no doubt an interesting woman” (10 April 1920).   According to his son, Breasted and Bell struck up a friendship that lasted until her death in 1926.  She led them on a few adventures and had so much energy that she “ran her male companions ragged” (C. Breasted, 276).   Breasted watched her force a diplomatic meeting between General Haldane, then the commander-in-chief of British forces in Mesopotamia, and a “recalcitrant Arab tribe whose sheikh she had befriended” (Ibid.).   The sheikh took the meeting to be a “flattering and deliberately planned gesture of friendship from Great Britain…and from that day forward he and his tribe became devoted allies of the Empire” (Ibid.).   Bell’s work was clearly as an active diplomat, while Breasted, the whole time painting himself as a passive witness to these international relations, clearly had some active role in the numerous meetings he attended.

This active role is apparent in the fact that he and his crew got permission to go to Aleppo, through the Syrian Desert, because their arrival would “coincide with the very important negotiations between the British and the Arabs regarding Anglo-Arab boundary on [the Euphrates River]” (25 April 1920).   The outcome of these talks would either allow or prohibit the area to be handed back to the local tribes; the Breasted party depended on the friendliness of the local leader for permission to travel through safely.  The Civil Commissioner told Breasted that if they show “good will by furnishing safe conduct to an American party as far as Aleppo,” then the British were more likely to give the area back to them (25 April 1920).   Breasted was more than happy to play this part in negotiations, as he was focused on getting his crew to Aleppo safely and getting access to a number of ancient sites.  He wrote to his wife:

“As regards the Syrian desert [sic] I would not write at all about it until the journey should be over…and you need not be troubled by the apprehensions which beset me as I write and which, in view of the circumstances, I need not conceal. I have thought the matter over well. It is a grave responsibility to take four men beside myself across four hundred miles of war zone, three fourths of which or nearly so are beset by treacherous Arabs” (25 April 1920).

He was clearly worried about the trip, as evidenced by the short, personal letters he wrote to each member of his family, professing his love and his safety but saying that if anything happened to him, he would always think of those he loved.  He wrote that he truly believed this work was all for the furthering of the Oriental Institute and for the furthering of archaeology; and it was.  But that was not all the trip was about.

As they approached Deir ez-Zor, on their way to Aleppo, their arrival was announced to the local leader, Maulud Pasha, and the crew were invited to dine with him.  He first visited the Pasha’s office and told him about the British planning to withdraw troops to nearly a hundred miles from the upper Euphrates, and by the time he had returned to his lodgings, he had five Arab officers waiting for him.  They were ready to discuss “the political future of the Arabs, because they had so much confidence in America and such admiration for the great republic, whose aid they so much needed” (7 May 1920).   They also asked about the intentions of the British, but Breasted did not report much on that to them, possibly for his own safety.  Later, at dinner, the Pasha and his officers expressed the same hopes to Breasted from his home country: “They all expressed not only admiration but affection for America and complete confidence in our ability to help them….I confess that this wide-spread respect for our country this general expectation of help which it was sure to send, threw a new light on our responsibilities.  The world was everywhere expecting great and new things from us” (7 May 1920).   The Pasha was clear in his expectations, however:

“What they wanted was for the English to go and leave the Arabs to run their own affairs, hoping for the guidance and advice of America, until the new Arab nation, after centuries of strife and disunion, could gather strength, gain experience and deserve a place with the other nations of the world.  They all expressed deep seated resentment toward the British, and unconquerable determination not to permit English domination.  It was, I assure you, a great surprise to me, and I believe it would be equally so to the British statesmen now guiding the British Empire” (7 May 1920).

This meeting, and the outcome of it, represents a shift in Breasted’s duties to the British.  With this meeting, he likely realized that not only had he volunteered in gauging native attitudes at this critical time, but would also be needed to give policy advice to His Majesty’s Government in the event.

Not long after the meeting with the Pasha, Breasted and his crew moved further east toward Aleppo and Breasted found himself in a meeting with one of then-King Feisal of Syria’s strongest and most powerful supporters, Sheikh Ramadhan Beg Shilash.  The Sheikh could not say enough good things about America or enough bad things about the English.  To corroborate this distaste, one of Ramadhan’s men raised a “massive tent-mallet” over Breasted’s head and “smote the ground several times with all his strength, saying that was how he would treat the English if he got the chance!” (7 May 1920).  After this frightening display, Ramadhan asked Breasted to carry a letter to a newspaper in Aleppo for him.  Breasted probably felt he had no choice but to agree to the task, and the crew reached Aleppo on 12 May, rejoicing in all that civilization had to offer.  The relief in Aleppo was not for long.  They had encountered a war zone and, with the threat of Arab tribes cutting off railway lines, Breasted immediately secured local protection and a rail car to the ancient site of Kadesh, where Ramses II had beaten the Hittites in c. 1270 BC.***   They continued on to the site of Baalbek, then to Beirut.  Upon reaching Baalbek, however, Breasted was accosted by two Bedouin and asked “bluntly whether he had delivered the letter which Sheikh Ramadhan Beg Ibn Shallash had given him to take to Aleppo….and he speculated to himself what might have befallen him and his party had he for any reason failed to deliver the letter” (C. Breasted, 301).   By this point, the importance of what Breasted was doing began to sink in.  His own life had been threatened regarding something as simple as a letter, and he did not miss the significance of that.  He also could not have been ignorant of the fact that the letter must have been important, as he delivered the letter in Aleppo despite having a high fever upon their arrival.

The team arrived in Beirut on 20 May and stayed for about a week, visiting colleagues, seeing ancient sites nearby, and acquiring artifacts.  Breasted also met with General Gouraud, High Commissioner of France in Syria during that time.  Although Breasted had seen the state of unrest “on the very ground” the French were attempting to control, he felt “obliged to keep quiet about it” (28 May 1920).   He did not keep quiet about tough issues when he met with King Feisal, soon to be King of the new Iraq, over a week later.  The two spoke in French, and Breasted said the conversation was “commonplace” until he brought up the journey he and his team had accomplished across the desert from Baghdad to the Mediterranean (29 May 1920).   Feisal was extremely interested in this feat, as well as the conditions Breasted witnessed throughout the new Arab state.  Breasted said he “did not hesitate to tell King Feisal the facts regarding the feeling there concerning his own brother Abdullah,” who had claimed the kingship over Iraq.  The people did not support him, and instead supported a “superb Arab,” a leader of a “sect of Puritan Muslims” (29 May 1920).   Feisal appreciated Breasted’s honesty and invited him to dinner a few days hence.  The dinner was official, with the American Consul and many of the King’s closest advisers in attendance.  Breasted was asked to sit at the King’s right, which was the official seat of honor.  Breasted wrote: “I was reluctant to take [the seat], as Uncle Sam was officially present, but of course I could not demur at any arrangement he [Feisal] chose to make” (3 June 1920).   They did not talk much of politics, as the King had already told Breasted that he thought the conflict between the French and English, in Syria and Palestine respectively, was America’s fault (3 June 1920).

Breasted and his crew then traveled to Damascus, and arrived in Jerusalem on 3 June, their final stop before returning to Cairo.  In Jerusalem Breasted was immediately swept into numerous meetings with the highest British Intelligence officials in the area, including the Major-General Sir Louis Bols.  Writing to his wife, he told her:

“I had to tell much of my experiences on the overland trip.  They were all talking of King Feisal’s absence in Paris, and were quite incredulous when I told them I had dined with him in Damascus only three days before.  I can’t begin to recount the conversation, but it was a very diverting game for me. …After lunch I went into a corner with [General Bols], and told him what I knew of Arab hostility to the British” (5 June 1920).

He seemed to delight in the fact that he knew intelligence that the British did not, in terms of the situation with native tribes and Feisal’s whereabouts, and that they were scrambling because of it.  The British Army and Government were anxious about Feisal’s allegiance to them, and Breasted told Bols “…that the sheikhs [he] had talked with showed little enthusiasm for Feisal” (5 June 1920).   Bols pressed him for details about the letter he had delivered to Aleppo for Ramadhan, but Breasted had no further information about it.  The two continued talking about the French presence in Syria, which was very unwelcome, and the British presence in Palestine, which was welcome but becoming troublesome (5 June 1920).

Breasted explained to Frances in his 5 June letter that he thought “It was a very curious thing that Sheikh Ramadhan handed me, an American stranger, a confidential letter to be delivered in Aleppo, while only an hour or two before me…an official of Feisal’s government had passed by the Sheikh’s tents on his way to Aleppo” (5 June 1920).   After talking in depth with two more British Army officials—General Waters-Taylor and Lord Stadbrooke, Commandant at Kantara (in the Eastern Delta)—on the train journey from Jerusalem to Cairo, he learned that he had indeed been a covert messenger for Ramadhan.  On 10 June he wrote Frances: “The plot thickens!…Sheikh Ramadhan’s letter, which he cunningly set the stage for me to carry, was evidently for the French! …He is working against Feisal’s interests again, and made me his messenger to the French without my knowing it!” (10 June 1920).   In addition, one of his expedition journals and some telegrams were likely intercepted by the French, so it was clear that Breasted was on the French radar as working for British Army intelligence.  He did not appreciate the fact that he may have helped them in their aspirations for Syria.

Upon his return to Cairo, he updated Allenby on his whole journey.  He focused his report to Allenby on his “apprehensions regarding Palestine if the present policy were continued” (10 June 1920).   The “present policy” was the Balfour Declaration, which Breasted likened to forcing “upon the protesting people of the land an utterly abhorrent Jewish supremacy, producing in Palestine a situation equally full of trouble and disorder [as in Syria]!” (5 June 1920).  Upon hearing this news, Allenby immediately sent Breasted home, via London, extending his trip by two weeks.  He commissioned Breasted to meet with Lord Curzon, the Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister David Lloyd George in order to update them on the latest situation in Mesopotamia.  He wrote letters to each of them, saying that Breasted “has just travelled through Mesopotamia, and by land to Aleppo.  He has therefore the latest and best information on these regions” (10 June 1920).   Breasted expressed his concern over this course of action to Allenby, saying “‘I devoutly hope something [can] be done, for the present policy [is] steering straight for trouble.’ ‘Yes,’ Allenby replied, ‘I think so too, and I have clearly told them so, but they won’t listen to me.  Perhaps they’ll take it from you’” (10 June 1920).   Breasted did not wish to refuse this call to duty, feeling, as he was, “very much in a dream…charged with an international mission which may have something to do with saving Palestine from civil war, and the whole Near East from conflagration” (10 June 1920).   But, that may have been the expected course of action all along.

Allenby had charged him emphatically multiple times to tell Curzon and Lloyd George all he knew from his overland trip.  In addition, the American consulate had asked him to dictate a full statement to send to the War Department in Washington, D. C., so that Wilson and the military could also know the state of affairs in the Middle East.  On the way to England, he wrote to his wife about the outcomes of his trip.  “Scientifically I have not accomplished a great deal.  But in the matter of museum pieces, and the practical foundation necessary to establish our work in the newly organized Near East emerging from the Great War, I am quite satisfied” (28 June 1920).   Breasted was well aware that the Rockefeller money given to his scientific endeavors, for the first year at least, had largely aided in the British Government spying on their newly colonized areas.  Breasted did not mention any of the discussion or results from those meetings in these letters from his expedition, although he wrote about it in a report from the first Expedition (JH Breasted 1920, cited in Abt, 232).   He wrote in a letter to Charles that he had met with Curzon for over an hour, but that the Prime Minister was absent at the Spa Conference and therefore could not meet with him (C. Breasted, 314).   Charles Breasted recounted his father’s summary of the meeting:

“I summarized our journey through Iraq and across the Syrian Desert; referred to the incident of the letter from Sheikh Ramadhan which probably reached [the French];…prophesied imminent disaster if the French continued their present policy of intimidation in Syria, and murderous inter-racial strife if the British adhered to the Balfour Declaration in Palestine.  …he startled me by throwing back his hands and exclaiming, ‘My God—to think that at such a time His Majesty’s Minister of Foreign Affairs should have been ignorant of the facts you have brought me!’” (C. Breasted, 314).

Curzon had to end their meeting quickly to deal with a labor dispute.  Before they parted, he told Breasted that the intelligence he gave was crucial, “‘even if—as I fear—they have reached my Government too late to forestall imminent catastrophe, they will nevertheless fortify us in any eventual modification of our Palestinian policy which circumstances may force upon us.’ He thanked me in behalf of his Government for what I had done and for what it implied of Anglo-American amity, and we parted” (C. Breasted, 314).   After this meeting, he returned home with a “greatly clarified vision of the project to which he now hoped to devote what with uncanny prescience he correctly anticipated as the fifteen remaining years of his life” (C. Breasted, 316).

*The King-Crane Commission archive is located at the Oberlin College Archives, in Oberlin, Ohio. It is the main collection of resources on the Commission. http://www.oberlin.edu/library/digital/king-crane/ It presents maps, letters, and analysis for scholars and the general public.

**Charles Breasted later recollected that he met with the Allenbys a couple of years after this trip and they told him that it was “only with the greatest reluctance and anxiety complied with my father’s request for transport and other facilities; for the High Command in Mesopotamia had reported conditions there as so dangerous that they had not expected to see him alive again” (261-62).

***Breasted wrote about this battle and Ramses II’s military strategy in “The Battle of Kadesh,” so this site was especially important to him (“The Battle of Kadesh: A Study in the Earliest Known Military Strategy,” in Investigations Representing the Departments: Semitic Languages and Literatures, Biblical and Patristic Greek, Decennial Publications, 1st series, vol. 5 (Chicago, 1904)). See also Abt, American Egyptologist, 92-93; 245.

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3 Responses to Part 4: The Paper and my #CVofFailures

  1. harngroup says:

    Reblogged this on HARN Weblog and commented:
    I claim my cookies!

  2. Pingback: Part 5: The Paper and my #CVofFailures | Adventures in History and Archaeology

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